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DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

Sherman J. Clark*
LAWMAKING BY INmATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND COMPARISONS.

By Phillip L. Dubois and Floyd Feeney. New York: Agathon Press.
1998. Pp. xii, 268. $30.
pARADISE LosT: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE.
By Peter Schrag. New York: The New Press. 1998. Pp. 344. $25.

The phrase "laboratories of democracy," as applied to the
states, seems most often to mean something more like "democratic
laboratories" - democratic testing grounds for various approaches
to social problems. What sort of welfare reform will be most effec
tive? Let Wisconsin try out Plan A, while Michigan experiments
with Plan B. What combination of tort liability rules will achieve
desired levels of compensation and deterrence? Let the states ex
periment with strict liability, comparative negligence, or various no
fault schemes. It is also true, however, that the states are literally
laboratories of democracy - arenas in which democratic institu
tions are themselves experimented with and tested. One such ex
periment, an institution now being tested, is the plebiscite. Since
South Dakota adopted the initiative a century ago, American states
have been testing the efficacy of direct democracy.1 Indeed, if the
current array of states utilizing the initiative had been designed as
an experiment to test that method of governance, one could hardly
ask for a better distribution. Approximately one-half do and one
half do not allow for the initiative. Those that do are spread out
from Maine to California, albeit with a somewhat greater concen
tration of initiative states in the West, and include both small and
large states. Collectively, the states now have a great deal of expe
rience with lawmaking sans legislatures.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1989, Towson State; J.D.
1992, Harvard. - Ed.
1. In the decade following South Dakota's adoption of the initiative, eight more states
followed suit. By the end of the progressive era, nineteen states had adopted the initiative.
Currently, twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia provide for lawmaking by initia
tive. Those states, in the order in which they adopted the initiative, are: South Dakota
(1898), Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Nevada (1904), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907),
Maine (1908), Michigan (1908), Missouri (1908), Arizona (1910), Colorado (1910), Arkansas
(1911), California (1911), Idaho (1912), Ohio (1912), Nebraska (1912), Washington (1912),
North Dakota (1914), Massachusetts (1918), Alaska (1959), Florida (1968), Wyoming (1968),
Illinois (1970), District of Columbia (1977), and Mississippi (1992). Dubois & Feeney, p. 28
tbl. 1.
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Those of us hoping to learn from this experience need several
distinct sorts of information. First of all, we need information about
the initiative process itself. Who has used it? To what ends? How
does it work? What procedural difficulties have arisen? What solu
tions to those difficulties have been attempted or suggested? Pro
viding this sort of information is the aim of Philip L. Dubois2 and
Floyd Feeney3 in Lawmaking by Initiative: Issues, Options and
Comparisons. Dubois and Feeney survey the initiative process and
outline the key procedural problems which have arisen in the prac
tice of lawmaking by initiative. While they focus on the experience
of California, Dubois and Feeney have collected data regarding di
rect lawmaking across the country and abroad. They accurately and
cogently describe many of the procedural issues generated by the
initiative: signature requirements, ballot complexity, voter under
standing, campaign finance, and judicial review. Dubois and
Feeney's valuable contribution is among the handful of books any
student of direct democracy should have on his or her shelf.4
Information about the initiative process itself is but one piece of
the puzzle. Making sense of the experience of the states requires
context. It requires an understanding of the political and social cir
cumstances under which real world initiatives are proposed, de
bated, and voted upon. Alongside political science, we need
political and social history; and that is precisely what Peter Schrags
offers in Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future.
Schrag's book is not about direct democracy per se. It is about Cali
fornia. It is about the political life of the state, and the way in
which that life has changed over the past two decades. As Schrag
recognizes, however, to write about California politics is to write
about the initiative. As a result, Schrag's book is as useful and in
teresting to students of the initiative generally as it is to those pri
marily interested in California politics. It puts meat on the bones
described by Dubois and Feeney, and :fleshes out the "too too sul
lied" political world in which the process must work.
I suggest, however, that the picture remains incomplete - at
least two additional pieces of the puzzle are needed. Not only must
we understand how the initiative process works, and not only must

2. President, University of Wyoming.
3. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
4. Essential recent book-length treatments of direct democracy include: THOMAS E.
CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE PoLmcs OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND REcALL
(1989); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSmONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1984); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT
INITIATIVE REvoLUTION (1989); BETTY H. Z1sK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRAss RooTS:
STATE BALLOT lsSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1987).
5. Peter Schrag, recently retired, was for nearly two decades the editorial page editor of
the Sacramento Bee.
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we understand the particular political goals of those who make use
of the process, but also we should try and think carefully about two
closely related aspects of the initiative picture. First, we need an
applied theory of direct democracy. I use the term "applied" to
emphasize that what is needed is not abstract theorizing but
grounded justification. On what understanding of democracy, or of
politics generally, is the plebiscite a wise or legitimate way to make
political decisions? What does the plebiscite accomplish that repre
sentative government does not? What are we hoping to achieve
through direct, popular lawmaking? It is nether adequate nor accu
rate to toss out airy abstractions about "the popular will," or "giv
ing the people a voice in government." What, precisely, is "popular
will"? On what basis can one conclude that the plebiscite is a rea
sonable way to measure it? Why is the initiative a sensible way to
hear the voice of the people?
Second, we ought to check the popular resonance of our applied
theory by investigating what might be called the social meaning of
direct democracy. What does the initiative process mean to those
who advocate its use? Is the public understanding of the plebiscite
the same as, or even consistent with, any available theoretical justi
fication? Why do people embrace the initiative as a form of gov
ernment? It is not enough to respond that people will embrace
whatever processes they think will get the results they desire. For
some reason, or some combination of reasons, the initiative has
been seen by many as more than simply useful. As Dubois and
Feeney observe, "many see the initiative as the very essence of de
mocracy" '(p. 1). Why so? One can imagine a glib response to my
question. The initiative has been accepted as the very essence of
democracy, one might respond, because it is the very essence of
democracy. The likelihood of such a response suggests the impor
tance of the question itself. How and why have we come to see a
practice eschewed by our federal Constitution and not permitted by
the states for the first century of our nation's history, as the para
digm of democratic government? What does the initiative mean to
us?
I. THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Lawmaking by Initiative grew out of research the authors did for
the California Policy Seminar, a joint program of the University of
California and the California state government. The book does not
contain new empirical research, but rather marshals and organizes
the available data in ways designed to allow an overview of the ini
tiative process. In this effort it succeeds. Dubois and Feeney de
scribe the process of initiative lawmaking with admirable breadth.
Lawmaking by Initiative would be among the first books I would
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recommend to a colleague or student interested in, but unfamiliar
with, the practice of direct democracy in America. What the au
thors fail to provide, however, is an adequate conceptual frame
work in which to evaluate the description they offer.

Lawmaking by Initiative begins with a brief discussion of the his
tory of the plebiscite in America and an even briefer discussion of
the theoretical issues surrounding direct democracy generally.
These chapters are unsatisfying. For example, Dubois and Feeney
gloss over the question of whether direct democracy is or is not
compatible with the sort of republican government envisioned by
the Founders. They offer little in the way of theoretical grounding
and do not outline a view of the goals of government against which
to evaluate the information they provide. Indeed, they seem un
interested in what to many might appear the fundamental question:
Is the initiative process a sensible or appealing way to go about
making laws? In their own words:
·

This book does not seek to settle the question as to whether the
initiative is a wise institution. Rather, it seeks to describe the major
issues that have arisen in the use of the initiative and to discuss the
policy options available for addressing these problems. By elucidat
ing the problems that have arisen and the possible solutions to these
problems, the book seeks both to inform the debate about the wisdom
of the initiative and to offer suggestions for improvement to those
jurisdictions that choose to use the process. [p. 2]
At one level, this is all well and good, there being nothing wrong
with a decision to inform rather than evaluate or theorize. Unfortu
nately, the information provided is rendered less useful, and the ac
companying "suggestions for improvement" less reliable, by the
absence of a clearly articulated conception of democratic govern
ment. Put simply, it is difficult to describe problems with a process,
let alone suggest improvements, without some sense of what the
process can or should be trying to accomplish. Imagine an architect
attempting to improve a building without thinking carefully about
the uses the building is capable of serving or intended to serve.
This lacuna does not undermine the entire book. For example,
the introductory chapters are followed by a comparative description
of initiative procedures. There, Dubois and Feeney's "just the
facts" approach is welcome and appropriate. In Chapter Four, the
authors review the various forms of the initiative in use. Chapter
Five briefly describes the initiative process in Switzerland and else
where. Chapter Six describes the processes employed by the sev
eral states in greater detail, addressing, for example, the distinction
between state constitutional amendments passed through the initia
tive and initiative statutes. This information will, for the most part,
not be new to students of the plebiscite, but it is well-organized,
accurate, and above all, clearly presented. A series of charts outlin-
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ing various comparative features provides a nice sense of perspec
tive on the variety, frequency, and nature of initiative lawmaking in
the United States (pp. 28-44). These descriptive chapters suffer lit
tle, if at all, from the book's lack of a thoroughgoing theoretical
grounding.
Beginning with Chapter Seven, the book turns to a discussion of
the procedural issues surrounding the initiative. Even there, the ab
sence of an expressly articulated conceptual framework is not a fa
tal flaw. Some procedural problems can be identified without
articulating a vision of what the process is intended to accomplish.
To return to the architectural analogy, regardless of the uses to
which a building will be put, one can assume that certain basic fea
tures - a solid foundation, a sound roof - are desirable. Simi
larly, in the context of the initiative, it can be safely assumed, that
providing voters with accurate information is better than misleading
voters and that comprehensible ballots are better than confusing
ones. For this reason, Dubois and Feeney's analysis of voter under
standing and ballot complexity is straightforward and valuable. The
authors describe the problem: voters often do not understand bal
lot issues or do not understand them as well as might be hoped. In
fact, some initiative measures have been so poorly (or deceptively)
drafted that substantial percentages of voters later reported having
voted contrary to their own preferences (pp. 118-19). Dubois and
Feeney review methods explored by various states in their efforts to
reduce complexity and better educate voters (pp. 113-80). For ex
ample, voter comprehension can be improved by limiting the length
and number of initiatives, requiring the subject matter of the initia
tive to be clearly stated in the title, and requiring the consequences
of a "Yes" vote to be clearly stated. Similarly, it may be possible to
improve the Voter Information Pamphlets provided to voters.
Other procedural issues, however, are more difficult to evaluate
without some sense of the ends the process is meant to serve. Con
sider, for example, the method through which initiatives are quali
fied. Advocates of a measure are required to collect a certain
number of signatures during a specified period of time prior to the
election. The number of signatures required is generally calculated
as a percentage - ranging from five to ten percent - of votes cast
in the most recent gubernatorial election (p. 33). California, for ex
ample, allows supporters of an initiative 150 days to gather signa
tures totaling 5 percent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial
election, a percentage which currently translates to something in
the neighborhood of 700,000 signatures (p. 97). This qualification
process has become highly professionalized, with paid signature
gatherers employed to supplement or replace volunteers. Dubois
and Feeney report anecdotal evidence that the process emphasizes
the efficient collection of signatures rather than the dissemination
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of information or the gauging of public opinion. The upshot is that
"paid circulators are able to qualify a measure even if no one cares
strongly about it" (p. 99). Even volunteer signature gatherers are
discouraged from any actual attempts at public education. Accord
ing to one widely quoted campaign manual:
Volunteers should not converse at length with signers or attempt to
answer lengthy questions. While such a conversation is in progress, a
hundred people may walk by unsolicited. The goal of the table opera
tion is to get petition signatures, not educate voters. All efforts to
educate voters will be futile if the initiative does not qualify for the
ballot.6

Research suggests that "only a fraction of the citizens who sign peti
tions attempt to read or understand what they are signing" (p. 96).
As a result, "[i]t is highly doubtful," Dubois and Feeney conclude,
"that the signature qualification process has ever reflected careful
voter deliberation" (p. 96).
Dubois and Feeney accurately identify one obvious problem
with this state of affairs - the lack of necessary correspondence
between petition signatures and public support. The authors as
sume that
it is desirable, as a matter of state policy, to have an initiative quali
fication process that is more reflective of the degree of popular sup
port for a proposal (or voters' willingness to submit the issue for a
public vote) than it is the ability of supporters to circulate their propo
sal. [p. 100]

On this basis, they outline and eyaluate a range of potential reforms
to the initiative qualification process, all designed to increase the
extent to which signatures on petitions reflect public support. The
authors conclude that "if the signature solicitation process is to be
come meaningful as a barometer of the breadth and depth of public
concern, ways must be found to separate the solicitation of signa
tures from the collection or acquisition of signatures" (p. 106). For
example:
Solicitors could be limited to discussing ballot measures with prospec
tive signators and to distributing the official ballot title and summary
along with appropriate campaign literature urging voters to support
placing the matter on the ballot. Petitions for signatures could then
be made available for voters to sign in a number of prominent public
locations, such as state and local government offices, public libraries,
and fire stations. [p. 107]

Dubois and Feeney's suggestion may or may not offer a method
of improving the signature-based qualification process, depending
on what counts as improvement. Severing the solicitation of sup
port from the gathering of signatures would in all likelihood reduce
the number of signatures obtained through pressure, but it might
6. P. 95 (quoting SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 199).
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also reduce the number of "legitimate" signatures that advocates
are able to obtain. Before one can decide whether the authors' pre
scription would make the process more effective, one needs to de
cide what the process ought to affect.
Dubois and Feeney are ambiguous on this point. They assume
that the process ought to reflect "the degree of popular support for
a proposal (or voters' willingness to submit the issue for a public
vote)" (p. 100; emphasis added). But of course these are two differ
ent things entirely. Do we want to measure popular support for a
particular issue? If so, we might want to ensure that as many signa
tures as possible represent informed decisions on the merits. Or do
we want to measure popular willingness to put the issue to a vote?
In that case, voters may well be able to decide with little or no in
formation about the proposal itself. One can imagine, for example,
a citizen reasoning as follows: "I don't know what I think about this
issue yet, but I do think that in general people ought to be given the
chance to vote on issues of this sort." Elsewhere, the authors argue
that:

The goal of reform should be to ensure that voters are sufficiently
informed about the contents of initiative petitions so that their signa
tures, considered in the aggregate, represent a critical minimum
number of individuals who are sufficiently dissatisfied with the sub
stance of existing policy (or the absence of policy) that they want the
matter brought before their fellow citizens for discussion and disposi
tion by majority vote. [pp. 99-100]
This represents yet another potential criterion. Perhaps signature
based qualification requirements ought to measure popular dissatis
faction with current legislative policy. If so, why the emphasis on
voters being "sufficiently informed about the content of initiative
petitions" themselves?
What sorts of issues ought to get on the ballot? Those with a
high likelihood of success? Those touching on issues as to which
popular dissatisfaction is high? Or might there be substantive crite
ria? Are certain kinds of issues better suited to plebiscitary law
making than others? These questions cannot be answered without
some understanding of what the initiative process as a whole is
designed to accomplish.
It might appear that the theoretical basis for the initiative is self
evident. Indeed, one reading of Dubois and Feeney would be that
they do not eschew theory, but rather assume it - they assume that
the theoretical pedigree of the initiative is so clear as to require
neither explanation nor defense. For example, the authors observe
that the initiative was supported during the Progressive Era by "re
formers who were searching for ways to make the political system
more responsive to the popular will" (p. 10) and was "designed to
increase the power of the electorate" (p. 3). They further note that
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the initiative is "widely regarded as a useful method for expressing
the popular will" (p. 3). Perhaps the theory behind direct democ
racy is nothing more complicated than populism. The populist
might put it this way: We believe in popular sovereignty. That
means that we, the people, are the source of political power. We
can and do delegate to our representatives the authority to make
many day-to-day political decisions, but we remain in charge. Di
rect democracy is simply a way in which we are able to make some
decisions ourselves. Call this the basic populist defense of the
plebiscite.
This understanding, or something like it, seems to have in
formed the decisionmaking of the Supreme Court in its most well
known direct democracy case, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter
prises.7 There, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
upheld the constitutionality of a City Charter provision, enacted by
popular vote, which required that any land use changes passed by
the City Council be approved by referendum. The provision had
been challenged as a standardless delegation in violation of the Due
Process Clause. The Court, however, held that:
A referendum cannot . . . be characterized as a delegation of power.
Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the
people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they
create. . . . In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to
themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise
be assigned to the legislature.8

The plebiscite, by going directly to the source of political power, is,
on this reading, the process least in need of guiding standards or
legitimating justification. According to the Court, direct democracy
is a straightforward way to "give citizens a voice on questions of
public policy."9
Despite its pedigree, this basic populist justification is neither
sufficient nor satisfactory. It is insufficient because it begs the ques
tion of which issues should be decided directly. Presumably, not
even the staunchest supporters of the initiative would be willing to
forego entirely the benefits of representation. Dubois and Feeney
list, as the first of several guiding principles: "The concept that laws
should normally be developed through the legislative process and
that the initiative is a device to be used primarily when the legisla
tive process is blocked" (p. 223). It is far from clear, however, what
one ought to understand by the term "blocked." Does this mean
"procedurally precluded from considering an issue," as in the case
of an entrenched state constitutional provision? Dubois and
7. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
8. 426 U.S. at 672 (citations omitted).
9. 426 U.S. at 673 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 {1971)).

1568

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1560

Feeney do not recommend limiting the initiative to situations in
which the legislature appears literally unable to consider an issue.
At the other extreme, "blocked" in this context could mean simply
"unwilling to give the people what they want." If that is the mean
ing of blocked, however, it provides literally no guidelines for limit
ing the appropriate scope of initiative lawmaking.
If, as seems likely, Dubois and Feeney mean to suggest that di
rect lawmaking is appropriate on some occasions but not others that some but not all issues ought to be submitted to a popular vote
- they need to provide some criteria. In a brief discussion of "Sub
ject Matter Restrictions," the authors offer a clue as to what sort of
criteria they might endorse. They note that many states limit the
extent to which budget matters can be decided by initiative. "Be
cause the appropriations process necessarily involves comparisons
among programs, it also seems unwise and ultimately unworkable
to allow a great proportion of a state's resources to be appropriated
through the initiative process" (p. 83). This suggests a criterion that
might be called severability. The initiative should be used for issues
that can be distinguished conceptually from others, such that the
decision on those issues will have limited impact on other matters.
This understanding would fit well with Dubois and Feeney's empha
sis on the single-issue requirement and with their willingness to dis
parage logrolling (pp. 126-29).
But how does a severability criterion fit with the authors' asser
tion that initiatives should be used primarily when the legislature is
"blocked"? More to the point, fiscal issues are hardly the only ex
ample of issues requiring comparisons. One's opinion on any issue
is likely to be influenced by one's expectations and understandings
of numerous other points. At bottom, the concerns apparently un
derlying a severability criterion reflect just one manifestation of a
long-recognized difficulty with direct democracy - complex, real
world problems are difficult to articulate in the form of the yes/no
dichotomies required by the plebiscite. If one were to limit the ini
tiative to those issues which truly stand alone in the minds of voters,
one might well end up with an empty set. It would, however, be
unfair of me to criticize the severability criterion after having my
self foisted it on Dubois and Feeney. Perhaps they would not em
brace that basis for identifying the proper role of the initiative.
Perhaps they would instead articulate an account of what it means
for a legislature to be blocked, so as to render direct lawmaking
appropriate. Perhaps they would offer some other criteria entirely.
My point here is that they have not done so in this book.
Dubois and Feeney's vagueness over the proper role of direct
democracy is perhaps indicative of a familiar tendency on the part
of students of direct democracy. There seems to be some sense that
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we can avoid comparing or adjudicating between direct and repre
sentative lawmaking because the two can coexist. Direct democ
racy, it is said, is not intended to replace representation, but merely
to supplement it.10 At one level, this is true. In terms of numbers
of issues decided, the initiative may be understood as a mere sup
plement. That is not the key question, however. The heart of the
matter is not frequency but authority, and the question confronting
people deciding what sort of political processes to employ is this:
What process has the last word? Direct democracy, where it exists
in the United States, always trumps representative democracy. An
initiative can overrule the legislature. The initiative does not sup
plement representation, it sits above representation, wielding, in
the words of the Court "a veto power, over enactments of represen
tative bodies." 11
That this hierarchy (initiative over representation) goes unchal
lenged, indeed unremarked upon, is evidence of the force and per
vasiveness of the basic populist defense of direct democracy
described above. If the people are in charge, and if initiatives mea
sure the will of the people, then of course initiative outcomes
should trump. Not only does the basic populist defense appear in
capable of providing limits upon the role of the initiative, it seems
as well to deny the existence of such limits. If one desires, as do
Dubois and Feeney, to somehow limit the role of the initiative, one
needs to qualify (or provide an alternative to) the facile assertion
that the initiative captures the voice of the people.
Fortunately, the basic populist defense of direct democracy is
not only insufficient but also unsatisfactory. First of all, plebiscites
suffer from a range of practical difficulties, many of which are docu
mented by Dubois and Feeney. Given realities such as confusing
and poorly drafted ballot issues, uninformed voters, limited and un
even voter turnout, and the pervasive influence of money, it is fair
to ask whether initiatives ever identify the preferences of an in
formed and considerate majority. While recognizing many of the
problems with direct democracy as practiced, Dubois and Feeney
fail to acknowledge that a sufficiently egregious set of practical fail
ings can undermine an o therwise appe aling theoretical
foundation.12

10. See Richard Briffault, Distrnst of Democracy, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 1347, 1350 (1985)
{book review) ("Indeed, to proceed by contrasting direct and representative democracy may
miss the point. We do not have to choose between the initiative and the legislature: in
twenty-three states we have both. In these states the legislature and the initiative not only
coexist but interact in a system of lawmaking.").
11. 426 U.S. at 673.
12. I do not mean to suggest that representative government is free from similar difficul
ties - agency costs, if you will. Rather, my point is that the practical problems attached to
the plebiscite make it impossible to conclude, a priori, that "direct" democracy is more re
sponsive to the electorate. Indeed, we will be unable to decide which method is more re-
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More fundamentally, it is not at all clear that the plebiscite
would be capable of meeting the goal so frequently attributed to it
- that of hearing the voice of the people - even if all of the practi
cal problems were resolved. For example, as I have argued else
where, even a perfectly conducted plebiscite would disregard the
intensity of preferences and thereby submerge interissue priori
ties.13 On this understanding, the "preference of the majority" and
"the voice of the people" are two different things entirely, with the
latter including information about the relative importance of issues.
Single-issue majority votes may tell us what the most people want,
but they cannot tell us what the people want most.
It may well be possible to answer this and other objections by
outlining a role for the initiative in the resolution of issues as to
which inter-issue priorities are less important. My concern with
Dubois and Feeney's book is not that it fails to come to terms with
my or any other particular theoretical objection to direct democ
racy. Rather, the difficulty is that the authors fail to offer any
grounding of their own - other than to note in passing that initia
tives are "widely regarded as a useful method for expressing the
popular will" (p. 3). This will not do. While I would and indeed do
recommend Dubois and Feeney's Lawmaking by Initiative for its
valuable and well-presented information about the initiative in
America, I would recommend as well that the authors' recommen
dations for improvement be taken with a grain of salt. Each of the
recommendations seems perfectly sensible, but I hesitate to take
directions from someone who has not paused to ask me where I
want to go.
II.

THE

P oLmCAL CONTEXT OF INITIATIVE

LAWMAKING

Peter Schrag ran the editorial page of the Sacramento Bee for
two decades, and is as well-placed an observer of California politics
as one could desire. In Paradise Lost, he describes what he has ob
served. Schrag lets us know what he sees, and he also lets us know
where he stands. He believes that California politics is a lesser
thing than it was decades ago in the heyday of Governor Pat
Brown, and that the initiative is part of the problem. Nostalgic for
the era of big, ambitious government, Schrag sees the initiative as
the tool and emblem of a pinched and small minded anti-communi
tarian social and political ethic. While it is possible to dispute
Schrag's characterization of California politics and easy to question
his allegiance to tax and spend governance, it is impossible to doubt
sponsive until we decide to what we want to respond - that is, until we fill in the underlying
theoretical gap I have attempted to identify.
13. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REv.
434 (1998) . .
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the value of Schrag's book to those interested in understanding the
role played by the initiative in the state which has used it the most.
In the Introduction to Paradise Lost, Schrag cogently and accu
rately summarizes the five sections of his book:
•

A section briefly describing California's heyday of post-World War

II optimism, itself probably founded on excessive expectations, that
peaked in the era of Pat Brown
roughly 1958-66
and an exam
ination of the demographic, economic, and political stresses that so
quickly began to undermine it.
A snapshot of California today, focusing on the state's Mississippi
fied public services and infrastructure and the fundamentally
changed government structure and social relations that California's
tax revolt and its political progeny have produced.
A section on the causes of the radical tax revolt that's associated
with Proposition 13, and its consequences in California's ability to
manage its affairs. Although 13 has become its enduring symbol,
the attempt to mandate fiscal policies has run through scores of
other ballot measures, some of them (in reaction to the tax limits)
mandating certain kinds of spending, most further restricting either
revenues or spending.
An elaboration of the history, dynamics, and broader implications
of California's orgy of plebiscites, as well as a discussion of the ma
jor measures of the past two decades, and their consequences both
in substantive policy and in the increasingly constrained exercise of
policy choices imposed on representative government in California.
A brief coda examining the possibilities for a new political integra
tion and a revitalized social ethic in California, describing the con
trary forces pushing even further toward a market-based
governmental ethic, and appraising the national implications and
the stakes that ride on the outcome of the conflict between them.
[pp. 19-20]
-

•

•

•

•

-

As Schrag sees it, California once represented everything good
and hopeful about American political life. During the postwar
years, the state poured millions into ambitious infrastructure pro
grams including, among other things, a highway system once the
envy of the nation. The public education system was unparalleled
and actually aimed for the now hardly imaginable goal of free col
lege education for all who could benefit from it. To this end, a total
of nine new state colleges were opened between 1957 and 1966 (p.
36). Government was big, energetic, and above all, confident. The
state government displayed, as Schrag puts it, "a cheerful willing
ness to raise taxes" (p. 35). Schrag quotes Governor Pat Brown's
response to an assistant who, in 1960, questioned the availability of
funds for the ambitious, multi-billion dollar California Water
Project given the rising expenses attached to public education.
Brown was undaunted: "We'll find enough money to do both.
We'll build the water project and we'll build new universities and
new state colleges and new community colleges and elementary
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schools, too. We've got plenty of money and we have to do it" (p.
35). As Schrag notes, this "was something that no California gover
nor - and probably no other American governor - would ever
say again in the same way" (p. 35).
Things have changed. For example, California has opened no
new branches of the state university system in the last two decades.
The state has, however, opened twenty new prisons. California's
public schools, once among the nation's best, now rank near the
bottom. The state's once gleaming freeway system is crumbling functional, but hardly the model it once was. Schrag attributes
these changes - this fall from grace - to a narrow and selfish,
market-based, political and social ethic. Schrag sees a state whose
more prosperous residents have come to view taxes as an unwar
ranted, external imposition rather than a legitimate, shared commu
nity obligation. The device which in Schrag's view has both
encouraged and facilitated the growth of this anticommunitarian
ethic is the initiative, the very paradigm of which is Proposition 13.
By the mid-1970s in California, inflation and economic growth,
combined with political measures designed to control development,
were driving property values sky high. While this growth repre
sented a boon for those who sold their homes, it meant just one
thing for millions of Californians with no plans to move - higher
property taxes. Between 1975 and 1978, assessed values for owner
occupied homes more than doubled, and the share of the total
property tax burden borne by the owners of single family homes
increased from thirty-two to forty-two percent (p. 139). The pre
vailing attitude among California homeowners was anything but
"cheerful willingness." Conditions were ripe for revolt - a revolt
which took the form of Proposition 13, a property tax limitation
initiative created by long-time political gadfly Howard Jarvis and
conservative activist Paul Gann. As Schrag accurately describes it,
Proposition 13 was designed to capture the interest, attention, and
votes of those who feared being taxed out of house and home:
[Proposition 13] would be a simple scheme that any voter could un
derstand: Property values would be rolled back to their 1975 levels
and could be raised by no more than 2 percent a year for inflation
until the property was sold and transferred, at which point it could be
reassessed at the purchase price. The tax rate would be limited to 1
percent on the value of each parcel, with the legislature determining
how that 1 percent would be apportioned among the various local
agencies that had previously set their own tax rates. The only excep
tion to that 1 percent would be for the cost of amortizing whatever
local bonds were still outstanding. But henceforth, local agencies, in-

May 1999]

Direct Democracy

1573

eluding schools, would effectively be prohibited from issuing any new
bonds.14

With a remarkable sixty-nine percent of voters turning out, Propo
sition 13, the Jarvis-Gann Initiative, won in a landslide, receiving
nearly two-thirds of the votes cast.
It is certainly possible to take issue with the substance of Propo
sition 13, and Schrag does allow himself a few shots. For example,
as predicted from the outset by opponents of the measure, the over
whelming beneficiaries have been corporate, rather than residen
tial, landowners. More generally, of course, one can ask whether
the particular balance stuck by Jarvis-Gann is ideal or desirable.
But Schrag's point is a larger one. The passage of Proposition 13
signaled not merely a dramatic shift in policy, but a fundamental
shift in the very form and method of government as well. In the
past two decades, increasing numbers of key political issues have
been decided by initiative rather than by the legislature. Schrag
outlines this transformation in a section of his book appropriately
headed "March of the Plebiscites." He describes in detail what he
calls the "modem plebiscitary cycle," a "spiral of public alienation
and disengagement, of constitutional reform, gridlock, unintended
consequences, further alienation, and more reform" (p. 188).
As Schrag sees it, the difficulty with initiative lawmaking is not
only that the wrong decisions are made, but also that decision
making is itself distorted. On one hand, the move to initiative law
making is generally understood as taking power from politicians
and putting it into the hands of the people.15 Whatever one thinks
about this characterization, initiative lawmaking certainly does one
other thing. The plebiscite moves decisionmaking away from an
arena in which a range of issues are considered in connection with
each other over a period of time, to an arena in which issues are
addressed in isolation, one at a time. It is this narrowing of focus,
this blinkered vision and concomitant piecemeal decisionmaking,
that is to Schrag, at least, as salient as the purported popular nature
of the initiative.
The most obvious way in which the tunnel vision promoted by
single-issue initiatives manifests itself is through poor or short
sighted decisionmaking. Sounding a theme which he has empha
sized elsewhere,16 Schrag describes the way in which California has
painted itself into a series of comers from which any movement at
all, let alone effective governance, is virtually impossible. One mea14. P. 140. Tue limitation on new bonds was subsequently amended, in 1986, to allow for
school districts to issue construction bonds if approved by two-thirds of the electorate.
15. As I have suggested, this characterization appears unwarranted. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
16. See Peter Schrag, California, Here We Come, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1998, at 20; Peter
Schrag, California's Elected Anarchy, HARPER'S, Nov. 1994, at 50.
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sure limits taxation and thus caps revenue, while another mandates
expenditures. Absent legislative accountability, responsibility is di
vided between (or lost among) a dizzying array of state and local
agencies. Schrag describes the situation nicely:
Paradoxically, the further the initiative process goes, the more dif
ficult and problematic effective citizenship becomes. California has
not just seen a sharp decline in the quality of public services - educa
tion, public parks, highways, water projects - that were once re
garded as models for the nation. It has also seen the evolution of an
increasingly unmanageable and incomprehensible structure of state
and local government that exacerbates the same public disaffection
and alienation that have brought it on, thus creating a vicious cycle of
reform and frustration.
Each measure, because it further reduces governmental discretion,
and because it moves control further from the public - from local to
state government, from the legislature to the constitution, from sim
ple majorities to supermajorities - makes it even harder to write
budgets, respond to changing needs, and set reasonable priorities.
And since many of those measures have irrationally - though some
times necessarily - divided authority between state and local govern
ments and among scores of different agencies, the opportunity for
buck passing is nearly unlimited. To cite the most glaring example,
because Proposition 13 specifically (and ironically) transferred a great
deal of effective spending authority from local governments to the
state, the state legislature, itself increasingly constrained by constitu
tional limits and mandates, allocates funds for local schools. But local
school boards have, at least in theory, and, again, within the con
straints of their own limits, the authority for spending it.
Thus, when funds run low or programs have to be cut, it is nearly
impossible to determine whether accountability rests with the state's
elected politicians for not providing enough or with the local board
for spending it wastefully. Something similar is true for county
governments. And since spending is so hopelessly tangled in formulas
that have been written into the constitution - directly by measures
like Proposition 98, which established mandatory minimum state
funding requirements for the schools; indirectly by a three-strikes ini
tiative that threatens to devour a large part of the state's discretionary
funds in escalating prison costs - the system often runs largely on
autopilot, beyond the control of any elected official. The whole fiscal
system, in the view of Elizabeth Hill, California's nonpartisan
Legislative Analyst, has become "dysfunctional." It "does not work
together to achieve the public's goals." [pp. 1 1-12]

Schrag details many of the negative, if generally unintended,
consequences of this situation, including the effect upon govern
mental decisionmaking generally. State and local policymakers,
hedged about by limitations and mandates, make decisions based
not on the long-term best interest of constituents, but based rather
on the arbitrary but inescapable exigencies of the near-gridlock im-
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posed by piecemeal, initiative governance. As an excellent exam
ple, Schrag describes the way in which local governments, barred by
Proposition 13 from making reasoned property taxation decisions,
pursue sales tax revenues above all else, seeming to eschew long
term light industrial or high tech development which might bring
high paying jobs (pp. 178-80).
It should come as no surprise that blunderbuss fiscal measures
have unintended consequences, or that measures passed without a
careful consideration of the big picture fail to form a coherent :fi
nancial policy. Initiative decisionmaking, however, not only dis
favors careful and deliberate policymaking, it also severely inhibits,
if not precludes, big-picture thinking. Initiatives, by their nature,
force voters to confront one issue at a time. On one day the voters
are asked whether they want lower taxes. On the next day they are
asked if they want funding for schools. On yet another day the
question is whether repeat felons should stay in jail. At no time are
voters, or their representatives, given an opportunity to evaluate
the relative importance, costs, and benefits of the particular meas
ures in a world of limited resources and interconnected political
realities.

Schrag makes a persuasive argument that the initiative is not
conducive to wise decisionmaking, but he also suggests a subtle and
potentially more troubling point. The plebiscite may bring out not
only the fool in each of us, but the knave as well. Direct democracy
is often lauded on communitarian grounds as a method of recalling
people to their status and duty as citizens. It seems, however, that
forcing voters to focus on issues one-at-a-time, and in isolation,
leads to decisionmaking which is not only short-sighted but selfish,
or worse.
Without making crass or oversimplified accusations, Schrag
builds a persuasive case that older, well-to-do, predominantly white
voters have become increasingly hesitant to fund programs they see
as benefiting primarily younger residents (those with school-age
children), minorities, or immigrants. Schrag correctly sees this hesi
tance as not a new phenomenon, but one which was evident as early
as 1978, when Howard Jarvis "was writing articles complaining
about aliens 'who just come over here to get on the taxpayers' gravy
train.' "17 Schrag does not blame the initiative for selfishness. In his
view, the initiative has been an outlet for, rather than a source of,
the narrow, anti-communitarian ethic he laments. But it hardly
seems a stretch to suggest that issue-by-issue initiative decision
making might be less conducive to communitarian generosity than
other forms of governance. When political issues are couched not
17. P. 139 n.17 (citing Illegal Aliens Take Free Ride on Gravy Train, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 17, 1978, at FS).
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in the form of "What should we do?" (as is at least possible in the
legislature), but rather in the form of "What do you want?" (as is
the unavoidable tenor of the ballot issue), an increased level of self
centered decisionmaking appears likely if not inevitable.

Paradise Lost contains even less theory than does Dubois and
Feeney's Lawmaking by Initiative. Unlike Dubois and Feeney's
work, however, Schrag's book does not suffer by the omission.
Schrag does not purport to be analyzing direct democracy. Nor
does he purport to offer suggestions for improving the process. In
deed, it might be fair to say that Paradise Lost is not about direct
democracy at all, although that might be an exaggeration, given that
the book is well-researched and does contain a fair amount of infor
mation about the evolution and use of the initiative in California.
My point is that the book is useful, even invaluable, to students of
the plebiscite not for what it says about the initiative, but for its
description of the political world in which certain well-known initia
tives were enacted. Accordingly, one does not expect Paradise Lost
to offer a theory of the plebiscite, and one is neither disappointed
nor misled by the absence of any such theory.
This is not to say, however, that Schrag's analysis is completely
satisfying. Although it would be unfair to expect him to provide the
applied theory found wanting in Dubois and Feeney, it would not
be at all unreasonable to ask Schrag to help fill an analogous gap in
our understanding of the plebiscite. Schrag is admirably, perhaps
even uniquely placed to describe and evaluate the public equivalent
of applied theory - social meaning. Paradise Lost is less useful
than it might be because he does not strive to understand or com
municate to the reader any sense of what the processes of direct
democracy mean to those who make use of them.
It is easy to miss an important distinction here. Schrag does an
excellent job explaining what the issues mean to the parties in
volved. He is an astute and careful student of human motivations.
Not only does Schrag give us a good sense of what moved the key
political players in the drama he describes, but he also provides val
uable insight into the ways in which the current political environ
ment in California - meaning, in this context, the motivations and
understandings of the voters - is intimately interconnected with
the changing demographics of the state. Schrag understands that
political issues have meanings and that those meanings can matter
as much as the concrete, material costs and benefits of this program
or that. What Schrag fails to recognize, or at least fails to discuss, is
the possibility that political processes may have meanings as well.
One might be tempted to ask whether political processes mean
anything at all. Do people really care about which political
processes are employed, apart, that is, from the strategic question
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of which process is likely to effect a particular, desired result? His
torically, the answer seems to be a resounding yes. Wars are fought
over forms of governance. People care not only about what the
rules are, but also about how they are made, and those who would
debate the propriety of lawmaking by initiative need to figure out
what that process means to those who support and utilize it. I have
argued elsewhere that jurists, journalists, politicians, and academics
tend to argue as though "more direct" meant "more democratic."18
On one potential understanding, therefore, direct democracy stands
to representative democracy as the authentic to the second best.
On this reading, the plebiscite is "us" while the legislature is
"them." If this understanding - an understanding I have at
tempted to challenge - is, as seems likely, shared by the people at
large, criticisms of direct democratic outcomes will face an uphill
battle. If the process is in fact sanctified in this manner, pragmatic
critiques are likely to be perceived as elitist - academics and jour
nalists trying to tell the people that they don't know what's good for
them.
It will be argued that popular understanding of the initiative is
more complicated than this. I agree. What the people think about
direct democracy - what the process means - is not something
one could hope to capture in any simplistic formulation. No doubt
the "more direct equals more democratic" equation is part of the
social meaning of the initiative, but only a part. Journalists like
Schrag would appear to be, along with social scientists, the best
source of information regarding public understandings of direct de
mocracy. Given that Schrag has so cogently captured the public
debate surrounding so many of the particular issues California vot
ers have decided, one wishes he had also fleshed out the public
meaning of the processes through which those issues have been
confronted. What do Californians, and others, understand them
selves to be doing when they decide an issue by initiative?
ill.

CONCLUSION

The two questions left unanswered by the books reviewed here
- the questions of applied theory and social meaning - are closely
related: What do we understand ourselves to be accomplishing, or
trying to accomplish, through the initiative? Until we come to
terms with this question, it will be difficult for us to learn from our
collective experience with the plebiscite. Dubois and Feeney de
scribe the process. Schrag puts the process in context. We know
where we have been, and that is useful, but it will be hard for us to
decide which road to take from here unless and until we devote
some thought to where we are trying to go.
18. See Clark, supra note 13, at 434-36.

